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Gonzalez-Lopez and Its Bright-Line Rule: Result of
Broad Judicial Philosophy or Context-Specific
Principles?
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a five member majority, per
Justice Scalia, held that when a court wrongfully denies a defendant’s
counsel of choice, the remedy is automatic reversal, not some form
of harmless error review.1 The Supreme Court’s decision, by refusing
to balance a defendant’s rights against a trial’s overall fairness,
epitomizes rule-based jurisprudence. The decision, however, raises
the question of whether the bright-line rule it adopted arose from a
broad judicial philosophy that favors limited judicial discretion or
from the application of context-specific factors. This Note
acknowledges that a methodological preference for limited judicial
discretion likely influenced the majority opinion, but argues that
considerations arising out of the constitutional rights of those
accused of crimes also justified the bright-line rule in this case. These
context-specific principles are found in literature, including the work
of Jeffrey L. Fisher,2 the advocate who argued Gonzalez-Lopez. With
this case, Fisher completed a triumvirate of successful Supreme Court
arguments that started with Crawford v. Washington3 and Blakely v.
Washington.4
Crawford, Blakely, and Gonzalez-Lopez share a common
characteristic: each relies on a bright-line rule that eschews a
balancing of the interests of the government and the defendant. The
former two cases support Fisher’s “constitutional choice” analysis,
which suggests that the Court has a textual justification for applying
bright-line rules where the text of the Constitution reflects a choice

1. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
2. Jeffrey L. Fisher is a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Seattle, Washington,
and a professor at Stanford Law School.
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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rather than a value.5 The use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez,
however, is not clearly justified by this constitutional choice analysis,
but by context-specific factors that encourage more mechanical
protection of criminal rights. Even though Fisher’s constitutional
choice analysis does not explain the use of a bright-line rule in
Gonzalez-Lopez, the presence of context-specific factors, independent
of a general preference for limiting judicial discretion, justified the
majority’s use of a bright-line rule in this case.
Rule-based jurisprudence operates by identifying constitutional
principles and then positing rigid safeguards against their
infringement. The safeguard, or bright-line rule, that emerges from
this process encourages predictability in the law6 and represents a
synthesis of values and principles.7 Constitutional interpretation
based on such absolute rules limits judicial discretion8 and ensures
that judges enforce individual rights—particularly in criminal cases,
“when it may be unpopular to do so.”9 When universal rules govern
each litigant’s case, the system fosters a sense of true equality
before the law.10 Although modern commentators disagree on the

5. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1522–28 (2006).
6. Even those who generally oppose bright-line rules agree that some situations require
them, such as where there is a need for predictability. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 212–13 (1999) (“When there is
a strong interest in predictability, or when the Court has reason for confidence in a wide
ruling, narrowness is a mistake.”).
7. Id. at 213.
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68.
9. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1512; see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 865, 874–75 (1960). Justice Black thought it necessary to establish absolute rules in
order to protect against the power of the government:
To my way of thinking, at least, the history and language of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, which I have discussed with you, make it plain that one of the
primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from
the Government all power to act in certain areas—whatever the scope of those areas
may be. If I am right in this then there is, at least in those areas, no justification
whatever for “balancing” a particular right against some expressly granted power of
Congress.
Id.
10. Justice Scalia has spoken of the importance of binding each individual by universal
rules:
When a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if
the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but
that it be seen to be so. . . . [I]t does not greatly appeal to one’s sense of justice to say:
“Well, that earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine plus one.” Much better,
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merits of bright-line rules, it was the norm in early constitutional
law.11
Confidence in the bright-line approach eroded as it often
produced a poor fit between doctrine and the real world.12 A
balancing test can address this problem by facilitating an equitable
result while still respecting constitutional values.13 Like a bright-line
rule, a balancing test identifies the constitutional principle, but then
proceeds to balance that principle against a competing interest.14
Justice Holmes, for example, favored such balancing so that the
absolutes of the past would yield to the practicalities of the day.15
Although his view eventually carried the day, it was still a dissenting
view in the 1928 case of Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Knox.16 In that case, the majority determined that the states could
even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization
introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in
explanation of the decision.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).
For an argument that liberty is furthered by a rule-of-law system that generates predictability,
see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–73 (1944).
11. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 949 (1987) (discussing cases); see also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 432 (1995).
12. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 953. For indications of the modern Court’s inclination
(at least during the 1990s) to use balancing tests, see David L. Faigman, Madisonian
Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1994); see
also Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 301 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), but
also recognizing counterexamples in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19
(1992) and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990)).
13. Justice O’Connor has been the flag bearer of the flexible approach. See Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 321 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If indeed the choice is
between adopting a balanced case-by-case approach that takes into consideration the values
underlying the Bill of Rights, as well as the history of a particular sentencing reform law, and
adopting a rigid rule that destroys everything in its path, I will choose the former.”); JOAN
BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 278 (2005); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1506
(describing Justice O’Connor as a “consummate incrementalist”).
14. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 987 (“[B]alancing appears as an extra step in
constitutional interpretation. Once a court has done the hard work of explicating a
constitutional provision through the usual methods of textual, precedential, and
consequentialist reasoning, the result is subjected to another test—the weight of competing
interests.”).
15. Id. at 954.
16. See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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not tax gasoline sales to the Federal Government because a state
could not “retard, impede, and burden” the operations of the
United States.17 Justice Holmes dissented to such a rigid rule against
burdening federal functions, arguing that that the Court had the
ability to strike a balance between permissible and burdensome
regulation.18 With confidence in the ability of the Court to balance
competing interests, Justice Holmes declared that “[t]he power to
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”19 As in the
taxation of federal functions, application of a balancing approach in
other areas opens up a middle ground of constitutionality, allowing
constitutional doctrine to conform to the exigencies of reality.
A decision to adopt a balancing approach has several additional
advantages. Balancing epitomizes concepts of justice,20 fairness, and
reasonableness.21 In areas of doctrinal uncertainty, balancing based
on judicially determined factors allows for a gradual development of
the law, giving “flexibility without sacrificing legitimacy.”22 Indeed,
at a time when opposing values and rights vary in weight relative to
one another and from year to year, balancing leads to effective caseby-case administration of justice. Changes can occur in one direction
or another, providing for expansion or restriction of rights based on
the present societal circumstances.23

17. Id. at 222 (majority opinion).
18. Id. at 223 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court which so often has defeated the
attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far
without wholly abolishing the power to tax.”).
19. Id.
20. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908).
Pound argued that although the “scientific” nature of law tended toward public confidence,
the ultimate goal was justice, which sometimes required more flexibility:
Scientific law is a reasoned body of principles for the administration of justice, and
its antithesis is a system of enforcing magisterial caprice, however honest, and
however much disguised under the name of justice or equity or natural law. But this
scientific character of law is a means,—a means toward the end of law, which is the
administration of justice. Law is forced to take on this character in order to
accomplish its end fully, equally, and exactly; and in so far as it fails to perform its
function fully, equally and exactly, it fails in the end for which it exists.
Id.
21. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 962.
22. Id. at 961.
23. Id. at 960.
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The balancing approach, however, can distract courts from the
importance of constitutional values.24 When a constitutional principle
reflects only an invitation to balance competing interests,
constitutional theory has less value.25 With such relativity, the
individual rights protected by the Constitution occasionally give way
to other interests. Although reasonable people disagree about the
merits of sacrificing individual rights in certain contexts, our
Constitution prescribes certain procedures that must not give way to
balancing. Both Crawford and Blakely accord greater recognition to
some of these constitutional procedures.
In Crawford, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
“to be confronted with witnesses”26 required that a court subject
testimonial evidence to cross-examination. That is, if a witness made
a statement against the defendant and later became unavailable to
testify in trial, that statement may be admitted only if the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.27 In
establishing this mechanical protection, the Court set aside the prior
test, which protected a defendant’s right to confrontation by
requiring that an out of court statement offered against the
defendant either fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”28 The prior test
abstracted the Confrontation Clause to its underlying purpose—
protection against unreliable evidence—and then allowed a judge to
admit evidence under circumstances in which that purpose would
not be furthered by cross-examination.29 The Crawford Court,

24. Id. at 992 (“The balancing drum beats the rhythm of reasonableness, and we march
to it because the cadence seems so familiar, so sensible. But our eyes are no longer focused on
the Constitution.”).
25. Id. (“Ultimately, the notion of constitutional supremacy hangs in the balance. For
under a regime of balancing, a constitutional judgment no longer looks like a trump. It seems
merely to be a card of a higher value in the same suit.”).
26. The Sixth Amendment provides thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
27. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
28. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
29. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1507.
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however, said that the Constitution required more, holding that only
an absolute rule would satisfy the defendant’s right to confront the
witnesses against him.30
Similarly, when the Court in Blakely confronted the issue of
whether a judge could increase a defendant’s sentence based on
factual findings not made by a jury nor admitted by the defendant, it
held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that
each fact affecting the sentence must be admitted by the defendant
or derive from a jury verdict.31 Under Washington law, after a
defendant pled guilty to, or was convicted by jury for, an offense
corresponding to a statutory maximum sentence, the judge could
increase that sentence based on specified aggravating factors.32 The
Court held that in the matter of sentencing, the Constitution
foreclosed a “judicial estimation of the proper role of the judge.”33
Judges cannot use their discretion to balance away the defendant’s
right to a jury trial because the Constitution already outlines a
procedure—jury trial—that protects the rights of the defendant.
Both Crawford and Blakely recognized the importance of using a
bright-line rule—a mechanical safeguard—to protect the interests
recognized by the Sixth Amendment. Fisher seems to accurately
hypothesize that the bright-line rule in those cases stemmed from
the Court’s decision to read the Constitution as having chosen to
protect constitutional rights through an absolute rule.34 In
Crawford, the Court recognized a constitutional choice in the right
30. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. The Court stated as follows:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the
right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment,
not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.
Id. For an account of the argument Fisher made before the Supreme Court in Crawford, and
how one concurring Justice opposed the categorical nature of his proposed rule, see Fisher,
supra note 5, at 1507–08 (recounting his advocacy for a bright-line rule, and how he faced the
argument that the “Sixth Amendment right must yield on occasion” to a higher “truthseeking” goal (citation omitted)).
31. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–04 (2004).
32. Id. at 299–300.
33. Id. at 307. “[T]he very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the
Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”
Id. at 308.
34. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1522.
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“to be confronted” by witnesses. Similarly, the Court in Blakely
decided that the Constitution had already chosen the basis upon
which convicted criminals could be sentenced—the jury trial. The
Court in Gonzalez-Lopez also adopted an absolute rule, ensuring
automatic reversal for a defendant wrongly denied counsel of choice.
Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez provides additional opportunity to analyze the
merits of a bright-line rule and the considerations supporting the
Court’s use of such rules. This analysis will show that even where
Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does not explain the Court’s
use of a bright-line rule, the Court has other reasons to apply these
rules in the area of criminal constitutional law, including the Court’s
competence over criminal trials, a greater need for formalism in
criminal constitutional law, and the relative constancy of the criminal
process over time. Absent such factors, it could appear that the only
commonality between the three cases lies in the identity of the
author of each of the opinions: an ardent supporter of the bright-line
rule and limiting judicial discretion,35 Justice Scalia.36
This Note first gives context and background to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice, including both the
constitutional history and some of the judicial developments that led
up to Gonzalez-Lopez. This context and background highlights the
uncertain history of the right. Part III follows this uncertain history
into Gonzalez-Lopez and discusses the Justices’ divergent views on
the nature and scope of the right to counsel of choice and the
appropriate remedy for violations of that right. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the merits of rule-based jurisprudence in this context and
examines whether Fisher’s hypothesis adequately explains the
Court’s use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. In the end,
although the Court may not have responded to a constitutionally
chosen bright-line rule—as, according to Fisher, the Court did in

35. For purposes of this Note, bright-line rules are treated as limiting judicial discretion.
For commentary that more fully develops this point, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 158–62, 222–28 (1991); Stephen E. Gottleib, The Paradox of Balancing
Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 843 (1994).
36. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 210 (“[A]bove all, [Justice Scalia] seeks to develop
rules of interpretation that will limit the policy-making authority and decisional discretion of
the judiciary . . . .”); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1320–23 (1990); Tom Levinson, Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The
“Fundamentalist” Judicial Persona of Justice Antonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REV. 445, 452–53
(2006). See generally Scalia, supra note 10.
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Crawford and Blakely—the bright-line rule is supported by factors
that encourage the use of mechanical rules to administer criminal
constitutional rights. Although a preference for limiting judicial
discretion may have also influenced the Court’s decision, the
outcome is correct, and is supported by principles specific to criminal
constitutional law.
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
Although the full meaning and scope of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has not been fully developed,37 the right to counsel
recognizes the importance of fairness and arguably grants the
defendant a degree of control over the conduct of the defense.38
That defense, if effective, will help to protect the integrity of the
judicial system.39 This Part first briefly traces the right to counsel
from the English common law to the Bill of Rights, and then focuses
on how the courts have developed the doctrine under the Sixth
Amendment.40 This brief outline establishes the context and
background necessary to understand the discussion of GonzalezLopez by showing that history and precedent did not compel the
Court to apply a bright-line rule to protect a defendant’s right to
counsel of choice.
A. History of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The American understanding of the role of counsel in criminal
proceedings has evolved according to changing legal conditions. A
37. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 52 (2002)
(“[The] meaning and scope of the ‘right to [counsel of choice]’ have not been fully developed
or explained by the Supreme Court.” (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989))).
38. Id. at 51–52 (identifying several reasons behind allowing defendants to select their
own counsel, including “to grant the criminal defendant effective control over the conduct of
his defense,” to promote trust and confidence in the legal system, to enhance the feeling of
fairness, and to increase the probability that the accused will feel reconciled with the outcome
of the trial (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting))).
39. A credible judicial system must make some provision for an adequate criminal
defense. On the importance of constitutional safeguards to such a defense, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 643 (1996) (“Counsel,
confrontation, and compulsory process are designed as great engines by which an innocent
man can make the truth of his innocence visible to the jury and the public.”).
40. For an exhaustive list of bibliographical sources relating to the history of the right to
counsel, see TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 216–19.
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gradual evolution has occurred from the English common law,
which often denied the right to counsel, to our present system,
which recognizes a right to counsel of choice for those with means
to hire counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel for all
defendants. Underlying this historical process was the idea that
fairness depends upon an adversarial system in which a defendant has
a meaningful opportunity to prove innocence.
1. English common law
In light of the English common law right to counsel, the
American system has come a long way in improving the fairness of
criminal trials. A criminal trial in late seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century England looked much different from a criminal
proceeding of today. Private parties brought criminal charges against
the defendant, with the judge acting as a neutral referee between the
two litigants.41 A defendant did not have a right to access the
evidence against him or to compel witnesses in his behalf.42 For the
most serious crimes, defendants could not have the assistance of
counsel,43 while a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or trespass
could hire a lawyer.44 Without evidentiary safeguards and the
advocacy of counsel, fairness depended in large part upon how the
judge chose to conduct the trial.
Under the English common law, fairness took a back seat to the
need to maintain the supremacy of the government in the eyes of the
people.45 Without a police force and strong government to enforce

41. Id. at 2–3 (describing the conditions of trial, including the chaos created by the
defendant’s ability to question witnesses at will).
42. See id. at 3 (“Ordinarily, an individual charged with a felony was confined until the
time of trial. He did not receive a copy of the indictment, was not informed of the evidence
against him, and had no process for compelling witnesses to testify on his behalf.” (citations
omitted)).
43. Id. (stating that a defendant could not have assistance of counsel if charged with
serious crimes, “such as murder, manslaughter, larceny, robbery, or rape, or treason or
misprision of treason”).
44. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS
8 (1955) and John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 308 (1978)).
45. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (1992) (“This antipathy that the British
common law displayed toward the assistance of counsel derived from the weakness of the
government vis-à-vis its enemies.” (citing FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO
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the laws, the criminal justice system could not afford to be generous
to criminal defendants.46 Since felonies presented the greatest risk to
the stability of the society, the government had greater incentive to
deny defendants the assistance of counsel. Such a concession would
impede the efficiency of the system and undermine the power of the
government.47 Although some commentators justify the English
denial of counsel by the fact that defendants faced simple charges
brought by private parties with relatively equal power,48 this would
not explain why those charged with misdemeanors would receive
assistance of counsel, while defendants in felony cases had to go it
alone.
At any rate, with few exceptions, defendants accused of serious
crimes in England had no right to hire counsel until the early
nineteenth-century. Although the Treason Act of 1695 and gradual
judicial concessions increased the availability of counsel to the
accused,49 the right was not substantial and its existence and scope
depended on the discretion of the judge.50 With time, the
government increased in stability and criminal trials eventually took
on a more prosecutorial nature.51 In view of these changed
circumstances, in 1836, Parliament passed a law that allowed every
defendant to hire counsel, and in 1903, it extended that right to
indigent defendants in cases where “justice required such an
appointment.”52
In summary, at the nascence of the United States Constitution,
the right to counsel in England depended upon the discretion of the
judge in all cases except misdemeanors and charges of treason. Even
those who could afford to hire counsel had no certainty as to
whether a court would grant that privilege. The English system

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
10 (1951))).
46. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 3–4.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 4–5.
49. Id. at 6–7.
50. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 10 (“Because there was no statutory basis for this practice
[of permitting defense counsel to perform various trial functions on behalf of the defendant],
variations were frequent.”); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 7 (citing J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME
AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800, at 359 (1985) and Langbein, supra note 44, at
313).
51. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 7.
52. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 12; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 8–9.
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relied on the discretion of the judge to ensure the fairness of the
proceedings.
2. The Sixth Amendment and the Constitutional Convention
The American criminal justice system originally patterned itself
after the English system,53 but it gradually changed. In the early
eighteenth-century, many colonies addressed crime through the
public prosecutor, displacing the prior system of private criminal
litigation.54 This difference in procedure may have prompted the
colonies to create allowances for counsel to ensure the fairness of
trials.55 In addition, the number of trained legal professionals
increased in the colonies, and respect for the legal profession grew.56
With a greater need for representation and an increased number of
respected legal professionals, the colonies recognized that counsel
should play a greater role in criminal defense. This change would
give the defendant a chance to prove innocence while facing a
powerful state.57
The changed colonial attitude toward the assistance of counsel is
most apparent in the constitutional and statutory provisions that
protected the right. By 1791, only one of the colonies still adhered
to the English common law approach of denying the accused the
assistance of counsel.58 The remainder recognized the important role

53. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 15 (“Colonial records are produced to demonstrate that
a deliberate and conscious effort was made in colonial America to copy English substantive and
procedural rules.”); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9.
54. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9 (citing Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the
Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 101 n.112 (1995)).
55. Id. at 10; see also GARCIA, supra note 45, at 4 (“The prosecutor wielded great power
due to his familiarity with procedural niceties, the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of juries, and the personnel
of the court. As a consequence, the assistance of counsel and the allied rights ultimately
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment became essential to counter the prosecutor’s advantage.”
(footnotes omitted)).
56. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 9–10. Initially, the colonists had fostered hostile
sentiment toward lawyers. William F. McDonald, In Defense of Inequality: The Legal Profession
and Criminal Defense, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 13, 20–22 (William F. McDonald ed.,
1983).
57. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that the rights conferred on defendants are “designed to redress the advantage that
inheres in a government prosecution”).
58. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932); BEANEY, supra note 44, at 16–22
(summarizing constitutional and statutory provisions in each colony); GARCIA, supra note 45,
at 4 (stating that most state constitutions contained a right to counsel after the colonies
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counsel played in ensuring the fairness of the trial process. Given that
most colonies had already recognized the right to counsel, it is
hardly surprising that the Bill of Rights would contain such a
provision.
The right to counsel in the Bill of Rights did not generate much
discussion, although two states included a right to counsel provision
in their suggested lists of rights.59 The Convention adopted the
provision without any reported discussion.60 This silence could
indicate that the states generally considered their practices to be in
accord with the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel but could also
indicate relative indifference or consensus. In any event, the lack of
reported discussion concerning the right to counsel certainly does
not aid the courts in interpreting the clause.61
In summary, the historical record does not definitively resolve
the question of whether the right to counsel of choice deserves the
protection a bright-line rule provides. Those who oppose the brightline rule can emphasize the fairness considerations underlying
historical developments. For example, with the development of the
adversarial system, defendants needed counsel in order to obtain a
fair trial result. If fairness is the core reason for providing the right to
counsel, then, as some would argue, the right to counsel of choice
should not be absolute, but should be enforced only when unfairness
would result without its enforcement. On the other hand, those who
would favor an absolute rule can look to the history of the right to
counsel and argue that the American rejection of the English
system—which placed the right to counsel within the discretion of
judges—indicates a preference for enforcing constitutional rights
through mechanical safeguards. Thus, the historical record leads to
potentially conflicting conclusions as to the nature and scope of the
right and the extent to which it should be protected. History does
not unequivocally guide courts in making these decisions.

declared independence (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 828–29 (1975)));
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 37, at 10–13.
59. BEANEY, supra note 44, at 22.
60. Id. at 24 (noting a “dearth of discussion” concerning the right to counsel
provision).
61. Id.
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B. Fairness: A Main Focus of Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
In the years immediately following the Constitutional
Convention, the Supreme Court provided little interpretation of the
right to counsel because the Bill of Rights originally only applied
against the actions of the Federal Government.62 Although the
Fourteenth Amendment placed limitations on the activities of the
states, it did not incorporate all the amendments in the Bill of Rights
against the states. Indeed, when the Court finally began enforcing
the right to counsel against the states, it acted under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Although the Court initially
interpreted the right to counsel based on the fairness considerations
of due process, the Court now acts under the Sixth Amendment.64
Thus, the meaning of the right to counsel is not necessarily limited
to the fairness aspects of the Due Process Clause.
Notwithstanding the separation of the right to counsel analysis
from the due process analysis, the Court’s demonstrated willingness
to place limitations on the right to counsel of choice shows that
fairness still plays an important role in determining the scope of the
right. For example, the Supreme Court in Wheat v. United States 65
held that the defendant’s right to counsel of choice must sometimes
give way to the need to avoid conflicts of interest between chosen
counsel and other witnesses. When the Court chose to maintain
overall trial integrity at the expense of a defendant’s right to choose
counsel, some commentators lamented that the Court had relegated
the right to counsel to a fairness-based due process determination.66

62. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (“These amendments demanded
security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government—not against those
of the local governments.”).
63. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 60 (“The question, however, which it is our duty, and
within our power, to decide, is whether the denial of the assistance of counsel contravenes the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.”); Stuntz, supra
note 11, at 435–36.
64. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 308 (2004) (discussing the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment after granting certiorari on case from Washington
Court of Appeals); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (applying Sixth Amendment to
habeas petition from state court conviction in which defendant claimed denial of the right to
counsel).
65. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
66. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (“In essence, the Court has adopted the tenet that
defendants possess a revocable privilege to counsel rather than a fundamental constitutional
right.”).
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In Wheat, representation by Mr. Wheat’s choice of counsel could
have impaired the integrity of the decision through conflicts of
interest. Mr. Wheat and several co-defendants were charged with
conspiracy to distribute marijuana.67 Prior to Mr. Wheat’s trial, two
co-defendants represented by Eugene Iredale received favorable
results, which caused Mr. Wheat, apparently encouraged by these
results, to request Iredale as his counsel.68 In a hearing held to
discuss a possible conflict of interest, Mr. Wheat argued that little
potential for conflict existed because (1) he was willing to waive his
right to conflict-free counsel, (2) the possibility for a conflict of
interest was too tenuous, and (3) all three defendants waived any
future claims of conflict of interest and agreed to let Iredale
represent Mr. Wheat.69
In response, however, the trial court held that “an irreconcilable
conflict of interest exist[ed]” and denied petitioner’s request to be
represented by Iredale.70 At Mr. Wheat’s trial, the government
planned to call the second co-defendant to testify against Mr.
Wheat.71 In that situation, ethical prescriptions could have prevented
Iredale from effectively cross-examining the second co-defendant.
The prior representation created a serious conflict of interest such
that the court would have risked error on appeal if it had allowed
representation by Iredale. The court denied the substitution, Mr.
Wheat proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.72
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial court
struck the proper balance between a defendant’s qualified right to
counsel of choice and the court’s need to avoid conflicts of interest.73
The Supreme Court also affirmed, emphasizing the fairness
interest underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.74
Although the right to attorney of choice “is comprehended by the
Sixth Amendment,” the Court cited fairness as the core purpose of

67. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154.
68. See id. at 154–55.
69. See id. at 156–57.
70. See id. at 157 (“I don’t think it can be waived, and accordingly, Mr. Wheat’s request
to substitute Mr. Iredale in as attorney of record is denied.” (quoting the district court judge’s
ruling regarding the conflict of interest)).
71. Id. at 156.
72. Id. at 157.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 164.
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the Amendment.75 If the importance of one’s counsel of choice were
overemphasized, a court would have to grant every defendant’s
preference, regardless of resulting trial conflicts. The Court
recognized a presumption in favor of counsel of choice but not an
absolute right.76 An absolute right to determine the identity of
counsel went against the Court’s understanding of the Sixth
Amendment, under which “the appropriate inquiry focuses on the
adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer
as such.”77
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissenting opinions gave
greater weight to the importance of a defendant’s autonomy interest
in conducting the mode of defense. The dissenters reasoned that a
defendant should have a “fair opportunity to secure counsel of his
own choice,”78 although they agreed that this right is not absolute.79
The dissent, however, would accord greater weight to a defendant’s
interest in controlling the aspects of the defense, because “it is [a
defendant] who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”80 With
respect to the conflicts of interest, the dissent argued that respecting
a defendant’s autonomy interest would best promote the fairness of
the trial, at least in the important sense of how a defendant perceives
the fairness of the trial.81
Wheat illustrates that a defendant does not have an absolute right
to counsel of choice and that restrictions on that right often stem
from considerations of trial integrity.82 Given the impact of Wheat,

75. Id. at 159.
76. See id. at 160.
77. Id. at 159 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984)).
78. Id. at 165 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
(1932)).
79. See id. at 166.
80. Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975)).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 166 (“[A] trial court may in certain situations reject a defendant’s choice
of counsel on the ground of a potential conflict of interest, because a serious conflict may
indeed destroy the integrity of the trial process.”). In addition, a defendant does not have the
right to choose a lawyer who is not a member of the bar, “may not insist on representation by
an attorney he cannot afford” or who refuses to stand as counsel, and may not select an
attorney who has a previous relationship with an opposing party. Id. at 159 (majority opinion).
Finally, under proper circumstances, a court may effectively disqualify a defendant’s choice of
counsel if a trial is scheduled to begin on a certain date, and defendant’s counsel has other
commitments until after that date. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557,
2567 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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further concessions might also occur in the name of fairness. Fairness
considerations could lead the Court to treat the right (1) as a due
process-based right to a fair trial; (2) as a right that promotes the
integrity of the trial process, or, applying a more absolute view; (3)
as a procedural requirement that grants the defendant control over
the defense.83 Of the three options, the language in the Court’s
opinion could lead to the conclusion that the right to counsel means
little more than a due process-based determination of fairness.84 Yet
the other interests, especially the defendant’s interest in controlling
the conduct of the defense, arguably deserved recognition.85 A future
Court would have to give more direction.
The Court in Wheat circumscribed the right to counsel of choice
by the need to maintain the integrity of the trial process. Its
discussion focused on the issue of whether the trial court wrongfully
denied the defendant’s counsel of choice. The facts in Wheat differ
from Gonzalez-Lopez, where the Court had to decide the remedy for
the wrongful denial of counsel of choice. Nonetheless, Wheat still
provides a good backdrop to the discussion of Gonzalez-Lopez
because it shows how the Court has evaluated the right based on
fairness considerations, not on an absolute conception of the right.
III. UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-LOPEZ
A. Facts
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court faced the issue of
whether wrongful denial of a defendant’s counsel of choice required

83. See Eugene L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise
in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 381 (1992) (stating that the
Court could go in one of three directions from Wheat: (1) it could retain the right only so far
as it furthers the Sixth Amendment purpose of obtaining a fair trial, (2) it could focus on the
institutional goals promoted by the right, or (3) it could view the right as part of the Sixth
Amendment’s interest in granting criminal defendants control over their trials).
84. See id. at 351 (stating that although Wheat could be seen to isolate the Sixth
Amendment’s goal of assuring a fair trial as the sole purpose of the right to counsel, the Court
likely did not intend such a shift in its position).
85. See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent
Criminal: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for
the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 188 (1998) (“In addition to the systemic interest in
promoting the adversarial system of criminal justice, recognition of the right to counsel of
choice also implicates the accused’s personal interest in autonomy.”).
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the remedy of automatic reversal.86 The facts involve several
characters: Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, charged with conspiracy
to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, and three
defense attorneys.87 Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez’s family hired the first
attorney, who later withdrew after Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez selected
different counsel.88 The federal district court, however, denied this
choice of counsel, because the district court believed the attorney
Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez selected had violated a court rule in a previous
representation.89 Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez proceeded to trial with a third
attorney and was found guilty by the jury.90 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit held that the district court had misinterpreted the court rule,
making the denial of the defendant’s chosen counsel erroneous.91
More importantly, the Eighth Circuit determined that the
erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice was not subject to
harmless error review and thus required automatic reversal, although
it acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not addressed the
issue.92 The court recognized two types of constitutional errors: trial
errors, which occur during the presentation of evidence to the jury,
and structural errors, which affect the “framework within which the
trial proceeds.”93 The court determined that harmless error review
provides a sufficient remedy for trial errors, because the effect of the
error “may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence presented . . . .”94 Structural errors, on the other hand,
require retrial because they negatively affect “the framework within
which the trial proceeds.”95 The Eighth Circuit characterized the

86. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564–66 (2006).
87. Id. at 2560.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2561.
92. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 932–33 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’d,
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). The Supreme Court previously hinted that the wrongful denial of
counsel may require automatic reversal, but it had not decided the issue. See Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (cited in Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933).
93. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 932 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8
(1999)).
94. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993)).
95. Id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 8); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310
(1991).
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erroneous deprivation of counsel as a structural error, aligning itself
with the majority of circuit courts that had addressed the issue.96
Having determined that the denial of counsel of choice
constituted a structural error, the Eighth Circuit vacated the
conviction and remanded for a new trial.97 In doing so, it recognized
that the Sixth Amendment ensures not only fairness, but also that a
defendant will have a certain degree of control over the conduct of
the defense.98 The government appealed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.99
B. Holding
The majority affirmed the Eighth Circuit, holding that the
erroneous denial of counsel of choice required automatic reversal of
the conviction, with no showing of prejudice.100 In coming to that
conclusion, the majority first showed that the Sixth Amendment
“right to have Assistance of Counsel” was not merely the right to
effective assistance of counsel but the right to assistance of one’s
chosen counsel. Additionally, the majority defined the remedy for the
denial of the right as automatic reversal.101 Justice Scalia wrote for
the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The dissent, written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, disagreed on
both points.102

96. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050,
1074 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam); Bland v. California, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds
by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964
F.2d 993, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818
(1st Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 285–86 (6th Cir. 1985)). The Eighth
Circuit recognized that Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2004), had taken
a middle-ground approach by adopting an adverse effect standard, but joined the majority of
circuit courts in holding that the wrongful denial of attorney of choice warrants automatic
reversal of the conviction. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 933.
97. Id. at 935.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2560 (2006).
100. See id. at 2564–66.
101. See id. at 2561, 2564–66.
102. For an interesting discussion of the ideological division between conservative
Justices in criminal cases, see Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (2006).
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1. Majority’s evaluation of the Sixth Amendment right: Counsel of
choice
After reciting the pertinent text of the Sixth Amendment, Justice
Scalia cited cases for the position that the Sixth Amendment allows
defendants with sufficient resources to choose who will represent
them.103 Although several factors limit the scope of this right, the
government conceded that the district court had erroneously denied
Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez’s choice of counsel.104 The analysis of the
Court, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that Mr. GonzalezLopez should have been able to hire the chosen attorney. The only
questions were whether that denial violated the Sixth Amendment
and, if so, what remedy a court should supply.
Justice Scalia began by rejecting the government’s proposed rule
defining when the right to counsel had been violated. The
government argued that the Assistance of Counsel Clause would not
be violated unless a defendant who had been erroneously denied
counsel of choice could show that the denial prejudiced the
defense.105 This evaluation would essentially parallel the analysis
applied when a defendant claims that counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel.106 This focus on the fairness aspect of the Sixth
Amendment would arguably collapse the right to counsel into the
right to effective assistance of counsel.107 The majority rejected the
government’s proposed prejudice requirement, asserting that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees more than effective assistance of
counsel.108
In effect, the government would have the Court recognize that
the Sixth Amendment assures a fair trial and then disregard the right
103. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1988) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to
say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–96 (1984). Justice Scalia quoted a
portion of Strickland that states that prejudice requires a showing of a “reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct.
at 2561 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
107. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562 (“[T]he Government’s argument in effect reads
the Sixth Amendment as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and then
proceeds to give no effect to the details.”).
108. Id. at 2563.
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to counsel of choice “so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”109
Justice Scalia condemned this approach because it “abstracts from
the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.”110 He
identified the parallel process formerly applied to Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, in which the Court had said that “the purpose
of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of
evidence,”111 and then did away with formal confrontation of
witnesses when the evidence “bore [sufficient] ‘indicia of
reliability.’”112 The Court later recognized that the right to
confrontation existed independent of any judicial estimation of the
reliability of evidence, holding that the Confrontation Clause
“commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”113
Likewise, the Court stated that it would not reduce the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice to the identified purpose of
ensuring the fairness of trials, thereby allowing a court to deny that
right when it would not further the purpose of fairness. Instead, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires “not that a trial be
fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit,
that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be
best.”114 The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right to
counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial.115 If the Sixth
Amendment really only ensured fairness, then the defendant would
need to show prejudice (lack of fairness); but because the defendant
has a right to counsel of choice, its erroneous deprivation requires
nothing more “to make the violation ‘complete.’”116
An analogy to the right to effective assistance of counsel
misconstrues the Sixth Amendment, because the right to counsel and
the right to effective assistance of counsel originated differently. The
right to effective assistance of counsel, even for those without
resources to hire an attorney, originated from the fairness
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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Id. (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980)).
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).
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requirement inherent in due process.117 With its origins in fairness, it
makes sense to require a defendant to show prejudice in order to
complete a violation of the right.118 The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice, however, exists apart from due process
protections, and the Court refused to merge the two rights.119
Having refused to merge the right to effective assistance with the
right to counsel of choice, the Court held that the erroneous denial
alone violated the constitutional rights of a defendant.
2. Majority’s remedy for erroneous denial: Automatic reversal
Denial of constitutional rights rarely warrants automatic reversal
of a conviction; in most cases, the government has the opportunity
to show that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”120
An identifiable error that clearly does not influence the outcome of
the trial does not justify the expenditure of additional public
resources that would be required to retry a case. As the Eighth
Circuit has previously acknowledged, however, some errors affect the
framework of the trial—and not merely the manner in which it
proceeds121—and thus do not fit nicely into harmless error analysis.
The Court held that denial of counsel of choice cannot be
remedied through harmless error analysis.122 According to the Court,
the principle that separates errors subject to harmless error review
from errors that require automatic reversal is the “difficulty of
assessing the effect of the error.”123 Based on this standard, the
Court had “little trouble” concluding that the erroneous denial of

117. Id. at 2563 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970)).
118. Id. (“Having derived the right to effective representation from the purpose of
ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from that
same purpose.”).
119. See id. Some argue that even indigent defendants should have a right to more than
effective assistance of counsel. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1043–45 (2006) (summarizing
research that reveals the inadequacy of indigent defense); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The
Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 435 (1992). This Note
does not discuss this topic, although Gonzalez-Lopez, in strengthening the right to counsel of
choice, could have the effect of encouraging reforms that provide more meaningful
representation for indigent defendants.
120. Id. at 2564 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991)).
121. See discussion supra Part III.A.
122. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2566.
123. Id. at 2564 n.4.
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counsel of choice warrants automatic reversal.124 The Court
identified several factors that complicate harmless error analysis,
including the ambiguous effect of attorney differences in trial
strategy, defense theory, jury selection, and witness examination.125
The impact of these differences would be difficult to determine;
indeed, such a determination would be tantamount to an “inquiry
into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.”126 Due to
the difficulty of assessing the impact of the error, the Court held that
erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice requires automatic
reversal.127
Thus, the majority twice refused to subject the denial of counsel
of choice to some form of prejudice analysis grounded in concepts of
fairness. First, it identified the right to counsel of choice as an
absolute right with merit in itself, regardless of its purpose in
ensuring fairness. Second, the Court refused to subject the violation
of that right to harmless error analysis because of the difficulty of
assessing the impact of the error on the trial. In both instances, it
used categorical rules to protect the rights of the defendant.
3. Dissent’s characterization of the Sixth Amendment right: Assistance
The dissent emphasized the purpose of the Sixth Amendment—
fairness—and would have used fairness to assess a violation of the
defendant’s right to counsel of choice and the remedy for that
violation.128 In coming to its conclusion, the dissent focused on the
text of the Constitution and the purpose attributed to the text in
precedent. According to the dissent, the key word in the Assistance
of Counsel Clause is assistance—meaning that the quality of
assistance should be the touchstone of constitutionality.129 The actual
text provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”130 Given this language, the
dissent found it more legitimate to focus on the assistance the
accused should receive, not on the identity of counsel.131 Under this
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Id.
Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2564–65.
Id. at 2567 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2566.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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reading, the Sixth Amendment would grant the “right to have the
assistance that the defendant’s counsel of choice is able to
provide,”132 not the absolute right to choose who will represent the
defendant.
The dissent also argued that the historical and legal development
of the Sixth Amendment supports this focus on assistance. The
purpose of the Amendment was to counter the English common law
rule that limited the ability of a felony defendant to be represented
by counsel.133 To achieve this purpose, a defendant need not have
counsel of choice, but only such assistance as will ensure fairness.
Although at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
defendants chose their own counsel, this was necessarily the case
because “the availability of appointed counsel was generally limited
. . . .”134 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the history of the
Sixth Amendment does not require that a defendant receive
assistance from counsel of choice.
In addition, case law outlines limitations on the right to counsel
of choice, and these limitations indicate an emphasis on assistance as
opposed to choice.135 The right to choose has never been absolute;
many considerations can overcome the defendant’s choice of
counsel, including court eligibility rules, conflict-of-interest rules,
and court scheduling considerations.136 These extraneous limitations
“are tolerable because the focus of the right is the quality of the
representation . . . not the identity of the attorney . . . .”137 The
limitations on counsel of choice indicate that the Amendment
cannot inexorably guarantee a defendant’s choice of counsel.138
Even apart from the limits to the right to counsel, case law extols
the Sixth Amendment as a protection of fairness, not of the
defendant’s choice. The Amendment “assure[s] fairness in the
adversary criminal process”139 and was not intended “to ensure that a

132. Id.
133. Id. at 2566–67 (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973)).
134. Id. at 2567.
135. Id. at 2567–68.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 2567–68.
138. Id. (“These limitations on the right to counsel of choice are tolerable because the
focus of the right is the quality of the representation that the defendant receives, not the
identity of the attorney who provides the representation.”).
139. Id. at 2567 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
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defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he
prefers.”140 Given this emphasis, the dissent thought it unreasonable
to accord too much deference to a defendant’s first choice when
deciding whether the defendant must show prejudice to make the
violation complete.141 On the contrary, the emphasis on fairness
implies that a defendant should show some defect in the assistance
received in order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation. Thus, the
dissent reasoned that no violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs
unless a court error “diminishes the quality of assistance that the
defendant would have otherwise received.”142 The defendant could
receive a new trial by identifying a difference between the
representation received and that of disqualified counsel.143
4. Dissent’s remedy: A defendant must show prejudice
Given that the dissent would require an “identifiable
difference”144 in the quality of representation before finding a
constitutional violation, it would have no need to evaluate whether
that violation would be subject to harmless error review or automatic
reversal, because the test for violation already incorporates the
principles of harmless error review. Yet, assuming (as the majority
decided) that erroneous deprivation of counsel alone violates the
Constitution, the dissent still would subject that violation to
harmless error review before granting the defendant a new trial.145
This result follows from the rareness of automatic reversal as a
140. Id. (“[W]e reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful
relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1983) and citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983))). One scholar
recognized a problem with unchecked counsel of choice: that an attorney may develop such a
close relationship with a client that she or he may yield ethical considerations to the needs of
the client. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 670, 686–87 (1992). The Court’s hesitancy to recognize a relational right in the Sixth
Amendment may stem from this concern.
141. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2568.
142. Id.
143. Id. Notably, the standard proposed by Justice Alito would apparently require less
showing of prejudice than an ineffective assistance of counsel claim within the meaning of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), which requires a defendant to show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”
144. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2568 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriquez v.
Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2004)).
145. Id. at 2570.
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remedy and the absurd results that would follow from subjecting the
denial of counsel of choice to automatic reversal.146
According to the dissent, automatic reversal is reserved for errors
that involve fundamental unfairness, and the denial of counsel of
choice does not rise to that level.147 Although the majority
characterized automatic reversal as being appropriate whenever the
effect of the error is difficult to determine,148 the dissent focused on
the nature of the error.149 Only where the error was one that would
“render a trial fundamentally unfair” should a court grant automatic
reversal.150 Denial of counsel of choice does not involve this high
level of fundamental unfairness because the defendant often chooses
counsel unwittingly; furthermore, quality of representation often
does not differ between first- and second-choice counsel.151 The
dissent admitted that equivalent representation would not justify the
denial of the right to choice of counsel, but the high likelihood of
fair representation should “inform the remedy.”152
The dissent also thought that absurd results follow from the
automatic reversal of erroneous denials of counsel of choice.153 To
require retrial in cases where no prejudice resulted creates a
significant burden on the resources of the courts.154 The dissent
estimated that there would be many situations in which a secondchoice attorney would actually provide better assistance than the
counsel of first choice; or at any rate, the trial judge would know that
any difference in trial strategy did not affect the trial outcome.155 The
dissent thought this judicial determination was well within the
competence of the courts.156 Significantly, when a court cannot
146. See id. at 2569–71.
147. See id.
148. See supra Part III.
149. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2569 (Alito, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)); see also id. at 2570
(“The touchstone of structural error is fundamental unfairness and unreliability.”).
151. Id. at 2569.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2570.
154. See id. at 2571 (“The consequences of the majority’s holding are particularly severe
in the federal system and in other court systems that do not allow a defendant to take an
interlocutory appeal when counsel is disqualified . . . . [I]f an appellate court concludes that the
trial judge made a marginally incorrect ruling in applying its own pro hac vice rules, the
appellate court has no alternative but to order a new trial . . . .”).
155. Id. at 2570.
156. Id.

555

BRIGGS.FIN.DOC

4/5/2007 11:17:18 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2007

clearly discern the effect of the denial, the prosecution would have a
hard time proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.157 Thus, even if erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice
violated the Sixth Amendment—without any showing of prejudice—
automatic reversal required such a showing because the right in
question did not involve the categorical unfairness requisite to
granting automatic reversal.
The difference between the majority and dissent reveals divergent
understandings of the right to counsel of choice, and these views
found voice in the respective opinions on how courts should
administer the right. The majority favored clear rules that would
indicate when the right was violated and what the remedy should
be.158 The dissent, on the other hand, would allow judges to use
discretion to determine whether a Sixth Amendment violation
occurred and whether that violation warranted a new trial.159
Although both opinions rooted their analysis in the text of the Sixth
Amendment,160 each came to a different conclusion. This stark
difference in result, with both views framing analysis around the text
of the Constitution, indicates a methodological difference at play,161
and warrants further discussion and exploration.
IV. ANALYSIS
The fact that history, precedent, and constitutional text did not
clearly lead to the outcome in Gonzalez-Lopez suggests that deeper
methodological approaches of the Justices led to the divergent
outcomes of the majority and dissenting opinions. In particular,
Justice Scalia favors bright-line rules and limiting judicial

157. Id.
158. See id. at 2564–65.
159. See id. at 2569–71.
160. See id. at 2561, 2566. Indeed, the textual foundation for analysis is of great
importance to textualists like Justice Scalia. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) (“It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands
and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have
in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the
basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.”); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1132
(1996) (noting the importance of beginning with the text and sticking close to it).
161. One author has pointed out that methodology increasingly matters in the
disposition of criminal cases. See Barkow, supra note 102, at 1077. The analysis that follows
seems to vindicate that hypothesis.
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discretion,162 and that overarching methodology likely played a key
role in the outcome of this case. Although this methodological
preference influenced the majority opinion, other factors provide
independent justification for the bright-line rule. This Part analyzes
the approach of Jeffrey L. Fisher, as well as the academic literature
that addresses the merits and shortcomings of bright-line rules in the
criminal procedure context, in a search for other principles that
justify the use of a bright-line rule in this case. Fisher’s constitutional
choice analysis attempts to provide a textual justification for brightline rules. This neutral analysis, however, does not fully explain the
use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. Other factors specific to
the criminal procedure context provide independent justification for
the Court’s treatment of the right to counsel of choice. The Court’s
experience with criminal procedure makes a bright-line rule more
reliable than in other contexts; the important rights at stake implicate
a greater need for formalism; and the static nature of the criminal
trial means that a rule laid down today will not need modification
tomorrow. Given the strength of these factors, this Part concludes
that the bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez does not rely solely on a
methodological preference for bright-line rules and limited judicial
discretion.
A. Procedural Rule Not Mandated by Precedent
Both opinions proffered several factors in favor of their respective
approaches, yet neither opinion could definitively state that the
Constitution mandated the decision. Two pragmatic factors—
interpretive consistency and generous construction of rights—
support the majority approach; the dissent’s approach, on the other
hand, relies on history, recent judicial trends, judicial efficiency, and
considerations of fairness.163 The analysis below concludes that
substantive constitutional doctrine did not mandate a procedural
safeguard in this case.
Interestingly, had the Court adopted the analysis of the Eighth
Circuit, it could have found greater substantive backing for its
procedural rule. The Eighth Circuit said that the Sixth Amendment
entailed not only fairness, but also a defendant’s right to free choice

162. See supra note 36.
163. See infra notes 169–79 and accompanying text.
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in shaping the method of defense.164 By recognizing such an
autonomy interest, the Supreme Court could have bolstered its
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s
choice of counsel, not merely effective assistance of counsel.165 The
Court, however, declined to do so.166 Instead, it accepted the
government’s argument that the Sixth Amendment’s purpose is to
ensure a fair trial.167 The majority only differed from the dissent in its
method of ensuring fairness: it held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a “particular guarantee of fairness”—the right to choice of
counsel.168
Perhaps the strongest factor in favor of the majority approach is
that it distinguishes between the Sixth Amendment and due
process;169 yet, even conceding the need to draw such a distinction,
the majority approach does not necessarily follow. The majority

164. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 934–35 (2005) (“The criminal
defendant’s right to select the attorney of his choice to represent him, like the right to selfrepresentation, derives from the Sixth Amendment principle wherein the defendant has the
right to decide the type of defense he will mount.” (citing United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d
52, 56 (1979))); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (recognizing an
autonomy interest behind the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation).
165. The Court had the autonomy argument before it, not only as raised by the lower
court, but also in the respondent’s brief. See Brief for the Respondent at 23–24, 39–40, United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352). In addition, the Court
addressed the autonomy interest at oral argument, where “autonomy” was mentioned over
twenty times, mainly in response to questions by Justices Souter and Stevens. Transcript of
Oral Argument, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-352
.pdf [hereinafter Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript]. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia, who
wrote for the majority, made no reference to an autonomy interest in the opinion, and did not
use the word “autonomy” during oral argument. See id.
166. The Court did state that the defendant has a right “to choose who will represent
him,” but did not discuss the interests that supported that right. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at
2561 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
167. Id. at 2562. (“It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in that
Amendment is to ensure a fair trial . . . .”). The Court could have recognized an autonomy
interest behind the right to assistance of counsel. It had done so in interpreting other aspects
of the Sixth Amendment. See Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and
Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
397, 410 (2000) (“While the Court has alluded to three values—trial fairness, substantive
privacy interests, and respecting the autonomy of the accused—as reflected in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, close consideration of the Court’s work makes clear that the
fairness and autonomy interests are the primary, and perhaps the only, values presently
bottoming the right to counsel.”).
168. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562.
169. See id.
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forcefully argued that the Sixth Amendment should not collapse into
an effective assistance of counsel analysis.170 It argued that the right
to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel arose
separately and from different sources, and should therefore not
converge.171 This would suggest that erroneous denial of chosen
counsel completes the violation.
It does not follow, however, that the violation requires automatic
reversal, for in requiring harmless error analysis before granting a
new trial, the Court would not collapse the right to counsel into the
right to effective assistance of counsel. The two rights would differ in
the ease with which the prosecution could prove harmlessness:172 if,
as the majority asserted, a court would have difficulty assessing the
prejudicial effect of deprivation of counsel,173 this ambiguity would
make the prosecution’s argument for harmlessness very difficult.
Unlike the harmless error analysis associated with an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim—where the prosecution can point to the
harmlessness of the specific errors upon which the defendant
brought the ineffective assistance claim174—the uncertain effect of
the denial of counsel of choice would make it difficult for the
prosecution to meet the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A second factor favoring the majority approach is that it creates a
windfall for the criminal defendant. Many argue that the Court
should liberally construe the criminal rights protected by the
Constitution because political processes will not fill that role.175 In
light of this anti-majoritarian role, perhaps a mechanical rule better
protects a defendant’s rights. Although this argument has merit, it
does not show that the remedy for the violation of the right to
counsel must be automatic reversal. The Court could protect a
defendant’s right from the heat of passion that can accompany public
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2563.
172. See id. at 2569–70 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, when the effect of an
erroneous disqualification is hard to gauge, the prosecution will be unable to meet its burden
of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
173. See id. at 2565 (majority opinion).
174. See id. at 2570 (Alito, J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 10, at 1180 (“[Courts’] most significant roles, in our
system, are to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occasional excesses of [the]
popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will.”).
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trials by finding a violation of the right upon erroneous deprivation.
Then, on appeal, the defendant would have his or her rights
vindicated in a more dispassionate forum, with the government
carrying a heavy burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt. Only then would a defendant be denied a new trial.
Thus, it is not clear that precedent or constitutional
considerations mandated the Court’s bright-line rule.176 Indeed, the
dissent’s balancing approach had significant merit in this case. The
dissent’s approach would reconcile the history of the Sixth
Amendment with Wheat’s recent focus on fairness. In another, but
unrelated, aspect of fairness, the balancing approach would recognize
the inequity of allowing wealthy defendants a new trial upon
erroneous denial of first choice of counsel, while indigent defendants
have no right to choose their counsel and must show prejudice to
their defense in order to gain any redress for the mistakes of
appointed counsel.177 Most significantly, the dissent’s approach
would recognize the importance of criminal rights, but also give
greater recognition to judicial efficiency as a competing interest. A
balancing approach could save the expense of a new trial when
choice of counsel had no effect on the outcome of the
proceedings.178 The majority’s categorical approach refused to
recognize these interests, instead requiring automatic reversal—
“strong medicine” that should only be used sparingly.179

176. On the inadequacy of grounding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on analyses of
history and precedent, see Amar, supra note 160, at 1127 (“[P]recedent alone cannot guide
the way—even for those Justices who steer by precedent as their polestar—because precedent
in this field is so regularly contradictory or perverse.”).
177. Michael R. Dreeben, The Right To Present a Twinkie Defense, 9 GREEN BAG 347,
352 (2006). Gonzalez-Lopez does not bid well for the indigent criminal defendant’s perception
of fairness:
[E]ven if the Court cannot, through its decisions, equalize justice for the rich and
poor, it also need not . . . poke a finger in the eye of indigent criminal defendants.
Imagine this statement to the typical indigent defendant: “If you have incompetent,
or conflicted, or lethargic, or grossly inexperienced counsel, you have no ground for
complaint unless you can show that competent counsel would have created a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. But if only you were rich! Then, a
denial of your first-choice counsel would be the golden road to a new trial.”
Id.
178. Indeed, granting automatic reversal in all cases, without consideration of the public
expense associated with a new trial, arguably creates “[a] poor fit between doctrine and the real
world.” See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 953.
179. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2570 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Given that a bright-line rule can impair judicial efficiency and
that precedent did not mandate the rule, some other factor must
have influenced the Court’s decision to apply the bright-line rule. In
searching for such a factor, relevant legal scholarship should be
considered, including that of Jeffrey L. Fisher, the successful
advocate in Crawford, Blakely, and Gonzalez-Lopez. The following
discussion evaluates whether Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis
adequately explains the use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez
and examines other factors that might explain the Court’s holding.
B. Searching for the Basis of the Bright-Line Rule
Fisher outlines several factors that could lean toward the
application of a bright-line rule, including originalism, considerations
of administrability, and the enforcement of constitutional choices.180
Under Fisher’s analysis, the difference between constitutional choices
and constitutional values best explains the Court’s recent use of
categorical rules and he analyzes Crawford and Blakely to vindicate
this hypothesis.181 He does this by first showing that originalism and
administrability do not account for the rules adopted in those cases.
He then applies his constitutional choice analysis to determine when
the Court should apply a procedural rule, and concludes that his
analysis explains the results reached in Crawford and Blakely.182 This
analysis does not, however, explain the Court’s use of a bright-line
rule in Gonzalez-Lopez.
1. Originalism: An unlikely support for bright-line rules
Fisher suggests that although originalism informs the Court as to
the nature of the right in question, originalism will not determine
whether that right should be enforced through a bright-line rule or a
balancing test.183 An originalist defense of categorical rules would
suggest that the Framers placed criminal procedure guarantees in the
Bill of Rights in order to prevent judges from balancing away those
rights.184 Although Fisher acknowledges that the Bill of Rights
protects against the erosion of common law rights, he believes that
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1516–28.
See id. at 1523–28.
See id. at 1516–28.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1516–17; see also Black, supra note 9, at 874–75.
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bright-line rules are not absolutely necessary for the protection of
rights.185 “The leap from the Framers’ general intentions to the
means of implementing them is simply too great.”186
The majority in Gonzalez-Lopez did not attempt to make the leap
from the general intentions of the Framers to a requirement for a
bright-line rule. The Court instead harkened to principle; it was
unwilling to abstract the purpose of fairness from the right to
counsel and then eliminate the right.187 The Court also supported its
holding by distinguishing the right to counsel of choice from the
right to effective assistance of counsel, rooting the right to counsel of
choice in the longstanding practice of allowing defendants to choose
their counsel.188 The right to effective assistance, on the other hand,
originated from an understanding that fairness required a baseline
standard of attorney performance.189 The Court, however, did not
argue that the historical understanding mandated the bright-line rule
adopted,190 but that harmless error review would confuse the right to
counsel with the right to effective assistance of counsel.191

185. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1517 (“[I]t is one thing to say that the Framers intended to
install bulwarks against erosion and another to say that they intended bulwarks to segregate
only by kind and never by degree. A dam can still be effective while letting some water pass
through.”).
186. Id. at 1517. But see Barkow, supra note 102, at 1072–73 (arguing that originalism
sometimes dictates the categorical enforcement of rights); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and
Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of
Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 201–03 (2005) (recognizing originalism and
formalism as driving the bright-line rule in Crawford, but only formalism compelling a brightline rule in Blakely).
187. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006) (quoting
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
188. See id. at 2563 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Andersen
v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898); and BEANEY, supra note 44, at 18–24, 27–33).
189. Id.
190. Indeed, Justice Scalia may not have garnered the necessary votes for a majority if he
had based his analysis on original understanding, given that at least one Justice that joined his
opinion does not favor that basis of decision. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 249 (2002) (“The more literal judges may hope to find, in language,
history, tradition, and precedent, objective interpretive standards; they may seek to avoid an
interpretive subjectivity that could confuse a judge’s personal idea of what is good for that
which the Constitution demands; and they may believe that these ‘original’ sources more
readily will yield rules that can guide other institutions, including lower courts. These
objectives are desirable, but I do not think the literal approach will achieve them, and, in any
event, the constitutional price is too high.”).
191. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563 (“To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to
counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative
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Historical records often lead to conflicting conclusions as to
whether a bright-line rule should apply. Indeed, in the GonzalezLopez dissent, Justice Alito looked at the purpose of the right to
counsel and argued that “Assistance of Counsel” focuses on
assistance, not on the “identity of the provider.”192 The Amendment
ensured fairness by limiting the English common law rule that
denied a felony defendant the right to assistance of counsel.193 As
further evidence that the historical record can lead to different
conclusions, the dissent—in arguing that the Clause ensured fairness,
not that a defendant would “inexorably be represented by the lawyer
whom he prefers”—quoted one of the same interpretive cases that
the majority cited in support of its decision.194 Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez
seems to vindicate Fisher’s hesitancy to use originalism to explain the
use of bright-line rules. The majority opinion did not attempt to
base its holding on originalism, and the analysis of the dissenting
opinion revealed the inadequacy of an attempt to do so. Originalism
does not explain the Court’s use of a bright-line rule here.
2. Administrability: Not a factor in Gonzalez-Lopez
On then to administrability, wherein Fisher argues that although
a need for predictability encourages the use of bright-line rules, it
does not fully justify their use.195 Where rights are at stake, one
might argue that constitutional provisions should provide “clear ex
ante guidance and prove administrable in the courts.”196 In this
regard, there are many situations in which defendants, police officers,
prosecutors, and courts need to know how to structure their conduct

effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of
competence on whatever lawyer is chosen or appointed.”).
192. Id. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 2566–67.
194. Id. at 2567 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). As to the
conflicting conclusions that can be drawn from the historical record, see supra Part II, which
shows that on the one hand, the record indicates that the right to counsel was intended to
ensure a fair trial; on the other hand, the provision was intended to take away the ability of
judges to limit that right. Both sides can rely on such evidence to inform their respective
opinions.
195. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1518–21.
196. Id. at 1519; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–63 (1992) (recognizing the importance of certainty and predictability,
but warning that such certainty can allow the “bad man” to engage in reprehensible behavior
right up to the well-defined line).
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in carrying out the processes surrounding criminal prosecution.197
Administrability has particular importance for Sixth Amendment
rights because courts deal with these rights on a daily basis.198
Although the frequent surfacing of Sixth Amendment rights
usually creates a need for predictability, such a need did not support
the use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez because courts rarely
have occasion to deny a defendant’s counsel of choice. At oral
argument, the Court discussed the rarity of these cases, and Fisher
suggested that less than one such case reaches the federal courts of
appeal each year.199 In short, wrongful denial of counsel of choice
does not occur frequently enough to warrant a bright-line rule for
administrability purposes.
Thus, administrability cannot explain the Court’s use of a brightline rule in Gonzalez-Lopez. Indeed, according to Fisher, the need for
administrability, even where applicable, only frames the question of
what type of rule to apply.200 Given that originalism and
administrability fail to explain the Court’s use of a bright-line rule,
the discussion below considers the guidepost identified by Fisher: the
difference between constitutional values and constitutional choices.
3. Categorical enforcement of constitutional choices
Fisher’s guidepost separates constitutional choices from
constitutional values, and if applicable, may serve as a decisive factor
in a court’s decision between bright-line rules and balancing tests.
His rule says that “[w]hen the Constitution makes a choice instead
of identifying a value, that choice must be categorically enforced.”201
In other words, the Constitution makes a “choice” when its text
prescribes the procedure by which a court should protect the right.
Although many procedures are apparent on first reading, Fisher
identifies a textual tool for situations of less clarity: determine

197. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1519.
198. See, e.g., id. at 1520 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
199. Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript, supra note 165, at 45.
200. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1521 (“In fact, [administrability] really only frames [our
inquiry], because a need for easily administrable constitutional doctrine does not always lead to
categorical rules.”). Fisher goes on to note situations in which constitutional rights are at issue,
but the Court has refused to adjudicate the rights by means of bright-line rules. Id. at 1521–
22.
201. Id. at 1522.
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whether the right is phrased as a noun or as an adjective.202 Nouns
indicate choices, while adjectives imply values.203
The recent example in Crawford provides an illustration of the
categorical enforcement of a constitutional value. In Crawford, the
Court faced a constitutional text that granted a defendant the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”204 The Court
decided that only a procedural right to formally confront testimonial
evidence could satisfy the demands of the Constitution, because
“[t]he Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the
reliability of testimony in criminal trials . . . .”205 That is, since the
text of the Constitution describes a procedure (confrontation) by
which the defendant can challenge the evidence that witnesses bring
forward, courts must honor that “choice” by refusing to balance the
criminal defendant’s interest in confrontation against society’s
interest in justice or efficiency. 206
The question then, in relation to the right to counsel of choice,
is whether the text “Assistance of Counsel” represents a
constitutional “choice” that a defendant is entitled to a certain
attorney or, in the alternative, a guarantee that the defendant will
have the assistance necessary to carry out an effective defense. The
text, by enumerating “Assistance” and “of Counsel,” lends some
credibility to the idea that the Constitution prefigures a role for
counsel of choice. Indeed, if the Clause really only focuses on
“Assistance,” there would be little need for the modifier “of
Counsel.” To avoid attributing redundancy to the text, one must
acknowledge some importance of the role of counsel.

202. Id. at 1523.
203. Fisher analyzes several nouns and adjectives and their constitutional treatment:
A process either constitutes “confrontation,” or it doesn’t. A decision maker is
either a “jury,” or it isn’t. A person is either put into “jeopardy,” or she isn’t. On
the other hand, deciding whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” is a matter of
gradation and requires a balancing of interests. The same goes for deciding whether
a trial is “speedy”; whether punishment is “cruel”; whether bail or fines are
“excessive”; and whether process is “due.”
Id.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
206. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1524 (“The Sixth Amendment chooses ‘confrontation’
as the means of testing witness testimony; it provides no qualifier inviting, or allowing, courts
to balance the utility of that procedure against competing interests.”).
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Even considering that counsel should play some role, it is not
clear that the text mandates that a defendant choose the identity of
counsel. In the text, “Assistance” comes first and arguably bears the
greatest weight in the phrase. “Counsel” merely specifies the form in
which the assistance comes. It requires an inference not present in
the text to find that “of Counsel” not only invites the use of counsel,
but also prescribes counsel of choice as the necessary vehicle for
attaining “Assistance of Counsel.”207 The text does not clearly
indicate a constitutional choice that must be enforced through a
bright-line rule. Thus, Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does
not provide an unquestionable explanation of the Court’s decision in
Gonzalez-Lopez. Although the text prescribes a method (assistance of
counsel) for ensuring fairness, it does not prescribe counsel of choice
as the necessary means.
As a result, Fisher’s rule does not affirmatively bridge the
interpretive divide between the majority and dissent. In addition,
neither originalism nor a need for administrability justifies the
Court’s imposition of a bright-line rule. The majority applied a
bright-line rule after considering the traditional practice of allowing
defendants to choose counsel and the perceived problem of merging
the right to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel.208
The dissent considered the purpose of the Clause and also made
pragmatic arguments for harmless error review.209 The analysis to this
point has not provided convincing evidence that the majority’s
bright-line rule arose out of considerations independent of a
preference for bright-line rules and limiting judicial discretion.
C. Naked Preference for Procedural Rules?
If considerations independent of broad judicial philosophies
cannot justify the application of a procedural rule, then the
discussion returns to the bright-line rule/balancing test battlegrounds, with each side lauding the merits of its approach.210 Further
probing indicates that where ambiguity exists as to what the text

207. Indeed, the Constitution would best protect the right to counsel of choice by using
the words “Assistance of Counsel of Choice.” On the other hand, little discussion attended the
incorporation, adoption, or ratification of the Counsel Clause. See supra Part II.A.2.
208. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.
210. See discussion supra Part I.
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demands, the Court should apply the bright-line rule in criminal
procedure. Indeed, Fisher persuasively suggests this approach in
criminal procedure cases,211 and he supports that position by
pointing out the Court’s ability to create reliable rules of criminal
procedure,212 the greater need for formalism,213 and the relative
constancy of the criminal trial process.214 Thus, even if originalism,
administrability, or constitutional choice analysis do not explain the
Court’s use of a bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, the unique
characteristics of criminal procedure weigh in favor of bright-line
rules. A brief discussion of this additional analysis follows, as applied
to the Court’s choice to protect the right to counsel of choice with a
categorical rule.
First, the Court’s experience with criminal trial procedure weighs
in favor of using bright-line rules to protect criminal rights.215 The
members of the Court have direct and often extensive experience
with trial proceedings and know the contours of criminal trials.
Thus, one of the principal objections to bright-line rules—that the
Court lacks adequate experience to lay down a law that will bind
future courts—drops out of the analysis.216 With the right to counsel
of choice, judges see daily manifestations of the important role of
counsel in the presentation of a defense217 and understand the
intangible but pivotal role of counsel in the trial.218 During oral
211. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531 (“[A] general appreciation for the different natures of
constitutional criminal procedure and substantive rights suggests three normative reasons why
balancing is more likely to be dangerous to the essence of criminal procedure rights than to
other rights.”); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and
Standards, 1991 BYU L. REV. 351, 356–58 (discussing the rule-based nature of criminal law).
212. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1534–35.
213. Id. at 1531.
214. Id. at 1535.
215. Id. at 1534–35.
216. Id. at 1534 (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 209, 255 and Pierre J. Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 424–25 (1985)). The risk associated with laying down
a rule binding future courts is that it may not adequately address future situations, and
therefore the rule will lead to individuals “being sacrificed on the altar of rules.” Sullivan, supra
note 196, at 66.
217. For a detailed enumeration of the tactical differences attorneys may legitimately
pursue, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in
Support of Respondent at 5–7, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006)
(No. 05-352).
218. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Attorneys are not
fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges. Attorneys may differ as to their trial strategy, their
oratory style, or the importance they give to particular legal issues. These differences, all within
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argument, Justice Scalia acknowledged the unique role of counsel
when he suggested that mere competence is often not enough; a
defendant wants to hire the lawyer who will present the “Twinkie
defense”: the defense tactic, though seemingly absurd, that will win
the case.219 The Justices on the Court have enough experience with
criminal trials to know that choice of counsel matters and that a
court has no way of knowing how counsel, chosen by a defendant
but denied by a court, could have influenced the jury.
Some may argue that even when the Court’s experience creates
confidence in a bright-line rule, the Court should avoid a bright-line
rule because the mandatory nature of the rule deemphasizes the
values underlying the rule.220 Such an argument suggests that the
Court’s bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez would limit a lower
court’s analysis of the fairness values underlying the right to counsel
of choice, and this under-analysis would diminish the quality of
justice administered. Although the argument in general has merit, in
this case the very analysis that the argument advocates—that of
whether a violation of the right to counsel of choice triggers
fundamental unfairness221—involves sufficient uncertainty as to
betray confidence in the outcome of the analysis222 and thus
undermine concepts of fairness. In this situation, harmless error
review involves a level of uncertainty that would itself be
fundamentally unfair to a defendant’s constitutional rights.

the range of effective and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of a
defense.” (quoting United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979))).
219. Gonzalez-Lopez Transcript, supra note 165, at 17 (“I want a lawyer who will invent
the Twinkie defense. . . . I want a lawyer who’s going to win for me . . . and the criterion for
winning is not how competent is the lawyer necessarily.”).
220. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and
Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 115 (2005) (“I think it is fair to
say that the Court’s emphasis on formalism in its interpretation of the Bill of Rights distracted
it from specifying normative constitutional values in the criminal procedure arena . . . .”); see
also Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process
School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 159 (2005) (“[J]ustices who turn away from [an openended analysis of fairness] because they fear subjectivity are not likely to take a normative
approach to the provisions in the Bill of Rights.”).
221. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2569 (2006) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that automatic reversal is reserved for errors that involve fundamental
unfairness).
222. See id. at 2564–65 (2006) (majority opinion).
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Second, formalism223 is arguably more essential to criminal
procedure than other areas of law.224 As a practical matter, a court
approaches a very different task when depriving a person of life or
liberty than in many cases that deal with property. In the former
situation, the government exercises its “most awesome powers”225
and affects the individual in ways that have no parallel among
society’s other institutions.226 A fair government, in exercising these
powers, would establish clear ground rules by which it acts, “lest the
siren song of administrative convenience” overcome the
government’s obligation to seriously consider the impact of
impairing individual liberty.227 One disturbing feature of that siren
song is that the most egregious crimes cause the greatest cry for
convenience, making the need to protect criminal rights even
stronger.228 Bright-line rules help to preserve the criminal rights

223. Formalism involves the “concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (emphasis added). For a compilation of
other definitions of formalism, see id. at 510 n.1. Admittedly, formalism shares certain
similarities with administrability. Considerations of formalism and administrability can both vie
for bright-line or procedural rules. For purposes of this Note, however, different interests
underlie each. Administrability weighs in favor of a bright-line rule because that rule serves the
efficiency interests of the courts. Formalism, on the other hand, supports a bright-line rule
because that rule protects the individual liberty of the defendant. The interest in
administrability can be satisfied by any clear rule, regardless of its content; with formalism,
however, the content of the rule matters.
224. SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 149–55; Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and
the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1037–40 (2006); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531. For
an analysis of Crawford and Blakely in light of the need for formalism in criminal procedure,
see Bibas, supra note 186.
225. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531.
226. Government control over property, on the other hand, does have institutional
analogues: parents control property interests of children, an employer may deprive a worker of
the opportunity to work, and a church may deprive a member of the benefits of membership,
to name a few. None of these institutions, however, has the authority to deprive an individual
of life or personal liberty.
227. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68
(2004) (“Vague standards are manipulable, and, while that might be a small concern in run-ofthe-mill assault prosecutions like this one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged
cases like Raleigh’s—great state trials where the impartiality of even those at the highest levels
of the judiciary might not be so clear.”); David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on
Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 241, 242 (2001).
228. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1531–32 (“Discovering who killed a police officer—not to
mention, as the Framers might have posited, discovering who conspired violently to overthrow
the government—is more important than discovering who stole a slice of pizza. Therefore, a
flexible approach to criminal procedure rights is likely to make them vanish precisely when
passions are at their highest, and when those procedures are most important.”).
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guaranteed by the Constitution by ensuring a fair process that does
not give way to the exigencies of majoritarian interest.229
This reasoning also applies to the right to counsel of choice: a
defendant facing the force of majoritarian will can best enjoy the
“Assistance of Counsel” when that right is protected by a bright-line
rule. Given that judges know the importance of the interaction
between counsel and the jury, a judge could be tempted to find a
reason to deny a defendant’s chosen counsel in order to stack the
cards against a defendant or level the playing field vis-à-vis a
prosecutor who connects less effectively with a jury.230 In addition,
given that most cases do not go to trial, uncertainty with regard to a
defendant’s right to retain superb counsel could impair the
defendant’s ability to bargain for a reduced charge.
Of course, a formal rule must represent the assimilation of
reasoned principles to have any legitimacy,231 but in Gonzalez-Lopez,
the Court outlined the principles upon which it decided to apply a
formal rule protecting the defendant’s right to counsel of choice.232
Although a formal rule can obscure the process by which a Court
reaches a conclusion,233 Gonzalez-Lopez confirms that such

229. Although the political process can also undermine any procedural protection the
Court grants while acting in its anti-majoritarian role, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54–55
(1997), this does not give cause to abandon the anti-majoritarian role; indeed, it only makes
the role more vital.
230. The formal rule of Gonzalez-Lopez means that automatic reversal occurs upon denial
of counsel. Of course, that does not necessarily translate into more generous protection of the
right to counsel of choice, because lower courts may simply find that counsel was not
wrongfully denied (as in Wheat, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 70–82).
Although it is true that the bright-line rule of Gonzalez-Lopez does not remove all judicial
discretion from the administration of the right, it adds formality to that right. Most
importantly, it formally declares the meaning of the Constitution. Formalism need not cover
the entire ground in order to exert a positive influence in protecting rights.
231. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 157–58 (2003) (“Bright line rules that are not
principled provide neither guidance for law enforcement in dealing with the next case nor
protection for citizens.”).
232. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006).
233. See Schauer, supra note 223, at 514 (stating that formalism “obscures that choice
and thus obstructs questions of how [a rule] was made and whether it could have been made
differently”); see also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in
the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a judge to take full
responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives
at them—more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of hallowed
abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective history.”).
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obfuscation need not occur if the Court acknowledges the basis
upon which it holds.234
Finally, the relative constancy of the trial process also weighs in
favor of using bright-line rules to protect criminal rights. In many
contexts, the Court should hesitate to commit itself to bright-line
rules because doing so could discourage solutions to new problems,
especially where new problems have no analog in recent history.235 In
the area of criminal procedure, however, the concern of societal
change largely falls away because the reasons for granting criminal
rights remain the same.236
Consider the constancy surrounding the right to counsel: as long
as justice is administered through the adversarial system, a defendant
must have resources necessary to face the power of the state. Given
that the adversarial system is deeply rooted in the American tradition
and conception of justice, the Court can lay down a bright-line rule
protecting the right to counsel without concern that societal change
will alter the role of counsel in the near future.237 Although society’s
interest in combating crime influences the scope of the right to
counsel of choice,238 once a violation of that right is discovered (by a
court finding of wrongful denial of counsel of choice), the only
remaining countervailing interest is that of judicial efficiency in
avoiding a new trial. The Court appropriately imposed a bright-line

234. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562–65 (identifying a need to distinguish
between the right to counsel of choice and the right to effective assistance of counsel and the
need to avoid the uncertainty of harmless error review).
235. See Chen, supra note 12, at 266; Fisher, supra note 5, at 1535; Sullivan, supra note
196, at 66.
236. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1535.
237. With the Court’s knowledge of trial procedure and the constancy of that procedure,
there should be less concern over the use of bright-line rules to protect criminal rights. Even
those who criticize bright-line rules could recognize an exception that allows for their use
under such conditions. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 212–13 (“[W]hen the Court has reason
for confidence in a wide ruling, narrowness is a mistake.”).
238. The scope of the right to counsel of choice is limited in significant aspects, as
discussed supra note 82 and accompanying text. In addition, the public can influence the scope
of that right, as seen in the use of forfeiture statutes. These statutes effectively deprive a
defendant of the opportunity to be represented by counsel of choice by preventing the
defendant from paying for an attorney out of the proceeds of the alleged crime. See Karlan,
supra note 140, at 705. The forfeiture statutes survived constitutional challenge in Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) and United States v. Monsanto, 491
U.S. 600 (1989).
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rule because the nature of the efficiency interest and the right to
counsel of choice remain largely the same over time.239
These three considerations justify the Court’s application of a
bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, apart from a preference for
limited judicial discretion or bright-line rules. The Court’s familiarity
with trial practice, a greater need for formalism, and the unchanging
nature of criminal defense all weigh in favor of applying a bright-line
rule protecting a defendant’s right to counsel of choice. Of these
three considerations, the Court’s knowledge of the importance of
counsel to an accused’s defense seems to have carried the greatest
weight in this case, given that the Court devoted much of its
discussion to that point.240 The Court’s rule ensures that future
courts will resolve any uncertainty in the effect of wrongful denial of
counsel in favor of the defendant.
Absent such factors, an inference may arise that a preference for
limited judicial discretion241 led to the bright-line rule in GonzalezLopez, meaning that only stare decisis principles would hinder a
future Court in applying its own preference for a balancing test.
Although Fisher’s constitutional choice analysis does not fully
explain the bright-line rule in Gonzalez-Lopez, it provides a helpful
framework and will prove useful in future cases. Even where
constitutional choice analysis does not resolve the issue of whether to
apply a bright-line rule, other considerations show why the Court
should favor bright-line rules in the criminal procedure context.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in constitutional criminal law, beginning
with Crawford and Blakely, and continuing with the recent decision
in Gonzalez-Lopez, may indicate that the current Court is more
inclined than previous Courts to adopt bright-line rules to protect
the constitutional rights of defendants. If this indicates a trend for
future jurisprudence, the question arises as to what drives the
trend—a methodological preference for limited judicial discretion or

239. Although a given court’s degree of interest in efficiency may increase due to
crowded dockets, the nature of the interest remains the same. Similarly, the defendant’s
interest in counsel of choice may be greater when faced with a more onerous sentence, but the
nature of the interest remains the same regardless of the sentence faced.
240. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564–65 (2006).
241. See supra note 36.
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context-specific factors. Jeffrey L. Fisher argued Crawford, Blakely,
and most recently Gonzalez-Lopez, in which the Court held that a
defendant who is erroneously denied counsel of choice must receive
a new trial—without the judicial balancing of harmless error review.
Although the history of the right to counsel may not have mandated
this bright-line rule, Fisher’s analysis helps show why the Court held
as it did. His “constitutional choice” analysis provides a neutral
criterion for determining the applicability of bright-line rules. That
analysis involves deciding whether the Constitution has chosen to
administer rights through a bright-line procedure. Although
constitutional choice analysis did not clearly dictate a bright-line rule
protecting counsel of choice in Gonzalez-Lopez, the criminal
procedure context justifies the use of such a rule. In the criminal
context, the Court has the experience necessary to formulate valid
rules, and the important rights at stake implicate a greater need for
formalism. Additionally, the static nature of the criminal trial means
that a rule laid down today will not need modification tomorrow.
These considerations support the use of a bright-line rule in
Gonzalez-Lopez, and proffer an explanation independent of a putative
preference for limited judicial discretion. This case may confirm the
beginning of a trend toward bright-line rules in criminal law, a trend
that could also influence other areas of constitutional interpretation.
Jacob D. Briggs
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